Prior to the revolutions in physics in the early decades of the twentieth century, reflective individuals would likely have agreed with the following remarks about time by Roberto Torretti (1983: 220):
that the corresponding pairs of axes y and y', z and z' are parallel, that the x and x' axes coincide, and that the second system is moving in the positive x-direction in respect to the first with some constant velocity v. 5 We can therefore consider the first system to be "stationary", though we could with equal justice (given the relativity principle) regard the second as "stationary" and the first as moving in the negative x'-direction with velocity -v. Designating one or other of the two systems as "stationary" is a matter of expository convenience. We can now state Einstein's second postulate, the light principle: "Any ray of light moves in the "stationary" system of co-ordinates with the determined velocity c, whether the ray be emitted by a stationary or by a moving body. " (1905: 41) From these principles Einstein derived the Lorentz transformations, 6 mathematical rules expressing the relations of the co-ordinates in two such systems. If the "stationary" system has un-primed coordinates, the "moving" system primed coordinates, and the relative velocity is v, then Now consider two inertial frames in standard configuration, the system with unprimed co-ordinates being chosen to be "at rest" and the system with primed coordinates moving with some non-zero speed v relative to it along the x-axis. We can choose a pair of distinct points or events in spacetime, say the origin (the co-ordinates of which in the "stationary" co-ordinate system are of course (0,0,0,0)) and an arbitrary point on the x-axis at time t = 0 (the co-ordinates of which would then be (x,0,0,0) in that same system). Since these two events have the same fourth, or time, co-ordinate, we can say that they are simultaneous-at least relative to the unprimed co-ordinate system.
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The co-ordinates of these two points or events in the "moving" system may be found by applying the Lorentz transformations to their unprimed co-ordinates. We see that the co-ordinates of the origin remain (0,0,0,0) in the moving system, which should not be surprising given that the two co-ordinate systems were stipulated to be in standard configuration. The co-ordinates of (x,0,0,0) in the moving system, however, must be γ x, 0, 0,γ −vx c 2 ( ) ( ) , given the Lorentz transformations above. Since neither v nor x nor γ 6 is quite general and is a startling but uncontroversial feature of the special theory of relativity known as the relativity of simultaneity.
Three years after Einstein introduced the special theory, Hermann Minkowski (1908) re-presented the theory in a different manner, developing it as a kind of fourdimensional geometry. 8 Choose again the coincident origins O and O' for two inertial frames in standard configuration. Imagine a burst of light at O (or O'). In time t, a particular light-ray will travel spatial distance ct to reach a point P that we will call (x,y,z,t). 9 By the Pythagorean theorem the spatial distance of that point from the origin can be written as x 2 + y 2 + z 2 . We then have But if we consider the point P in terms of the primed co-ordinates, (x',y',z',t'), the same reasoning (including the light principle) will convince us that 
This last equation shows us that, while many quantities, like simultaneity, turn out rather surprisingly to be frame-dependent or relative to a chosen inertial frame, there is at least one quantity that is independent of or invariant between frames. This quantity is usually called the spacetime interval. In the example given, the spacetime interval is an invariant quantity determined by two points, the origin and the point P. But any point in 8 Most books on the general theory of relativity introduce the special theory geometrically. The classic introductory special relativity text in this vein is Taylor and Wheeler (1963) .
the spacetime may be chosen as origin of a co-ordinate system, so the spacetime interval is an invariant quantity characterizing a relation between any two points in spacetime.
But what relation is it?
The set of points or events that a light-ray from O can reach form an expanding spherical shell about O. If we suppress one spatial dimension, say z, then the points that a One can easily see that, given the finite specified speed of light c, there must be events that are so far from O yet occur so soon after O (in the "stationary" co-ordinate system, say) that no light-rays from O can reach them. For such events
+ z 2 must be greater than ct, and this relation must hold for the spatial and temporal co-ordinates in any inertial frame. In this case the invariant spacetime interval is greater than 0, and such events are said to be spacelike separated from O.
Conversely, there are evidently events such that x 2 + y 2 + z 2 is less than ct.
These are events are sufficiently near to O that some object traveling at a speed less than light speed c can reach them from O. For such events the spacetime interval from O is less than 0, and they are said to be timelike separated from O.
Consider now an event (or, as Minkowski calls it, a world-point) that is spacelike separated from O. Minkowski notes that (1908: 84) Any world-point between the front and back cones of O can be arranged by means of a system of reference [a co-ordinate system] so as to be simultaneous with O, but also just as well so as to be earlier than O or later than O.
We have, then, another way of expressing the relativity of simultaneity (for spacelike separated world-points or events). By choosing an appropriate value for v, the constant relative velocity of a "moving" frame with respect to the "stationary" frame, a frame can be specified in which any given point P' that is spacelike separated from O' (that is, O, when the two frames are in standard configuration) will be simultaneous with the origin O' in that frame.
Pre-relativistically, whether in (classical, Newtonian) physics or in our ordinary, commonsense way of thinking, simultaneity is by no means relative in this way. To our ordinary way of thinking, throughout the universe there are events taking place or occurring right now, as opposed to those that have taken place or are yet to take place at these various distant locations. There is one and only one now or present extended across the breadth of the universe. Aristotle captured part of this idea when he said (Physics 220 b 5): "there is the same time everywhere at once". Newton may well be expressing the same thought when he says (1962: 137):
[W]e do not ascribe various durations to the different parts of space, but say that all endure together. The moment of duration is the same at Rome and at London, on the Earth and on the stars, and throughout all the heavens.
In classical or Newtonian physics, the transformation laws that connected coordinates in one inertial frame to another (in standard configuration) are the Galileo transformations:
Evidently, when co-ordinates are transformed according to the Galileo transformations, events that are simultaneous in one inertial system are simultaneous in all, exactly as commonsense indicates that they should be.
Pre-relativistically, the successive occurrence of global nows or presents constitutes the passage of time or temporal becoming, the dynamic quality of time that distinguishes it from space and that seems to be essential to its nature. The relativity of simultaneity challenges not only the uniqueness of the now but also our understanding of the passage of time as well. If each inertial frame has its own sets of simultaneous events and if the principle of relativity states that no physical experiment or system (and we human beings are physical systems too) can distinguish one such frame or another as (say) genuinely at rest, then we are able to discern no particular set of simultaneous events as constituting the now or the present. If the passage of time is the succession of global nows or presents, then the notion of passage threatens to become unintelligible.
Yet what phenomenon seems more important or more intuitively evident to us than the passage of time?
Late in his life, looking back on his scientific achievements and their philosophical importance, Albert Einstein wrote the following (1949: 61):
We shall now inquire into the insights of definite nature which physics owes to the special theory of relativity.
(1) There is no such thing as simultaneity of distant events…
This chapter is an elaboration of Einstein's remark in three distinct but related areas: the conventionality of simultaneity, the relativity of simultaneity and the passage of time (or temporal becoming). Einstein's presentation of the special theory of relativity in 1905 initiated two decades in which new theories in physics (the general theory of relativity, quantum mechanics) arose to challenge many philosophical preconceptions. Questions raised by these theories are still the subject of intense debate, but questions raised by the special theory of relativity regarding the nature of time are also still deeply puzzling.
Minkowski elegantly modeled a world with no privileged distant simultaneity, but integrating this model with our intuitive understanding of time is still-more than a century after the advent of the special theory of relativity--no mean feat.
II.
In order to introduce the special theory of relativity--in particular the relativity of simultaneity--to the reader, the presentation in section I skipped over the most famous and arguably the most important (both physically and philosophically) insight in
Einstein's paper. The discussion in section I concerned ideas developed in § §2-3 of Einstein (1905) , but we need now to consider §1, "Definition of Simultaneity". It is useful to write the displayed equation above in a slightly different form:
Equation (2) tells us that the event that occurs at A at the same time as the event t B ,--that is, the event at A that is simultaneous with the event t B , the event at B at which the light signal from A is reflected-is, according to Einstein synchronization, the event that occurs at A exactly half-way between the time of the emission and the time of the reception of the reflected light signal. This way of synchronizing clocks is so natural that one is apt to overlook the fact that there is a choice to be made.
To see how choice enters the picture, recall that the light principle says that the speed of light in any inertial frame is c. As the special theory of relativity is usually understood, this speed is taken to be an upper limit for the speed of propagation of any causal process. 12 In classical physics there is no upper limit to the speed of causal propagation. In Roberto Torretti's words:
Before Einstein… nobody appears to have seriously disputed that any two events might be causally related to each other, regardless of their spatial and temporal distance. 
where 0 < ε < 1. Reichenbach's thesis is called the conventionality of simultaneity.
The conventionality of simultaneity is quite different from the relativity of simultaneity. Given an "observer" or (in the example most used nowadays) a space ship far from any planets or stars that is not accelerating, its path in spacetime is a straight line. Given that particular straight line, the conventionality thesis claims that clocks distant from it can be synchronized with the space ship clocks in many ways-in fact, an infinite number of ways-although one way does seem simpler than the others and so is usually preferred. That preference is just that, conventionalists say, a preference. It reflects no matter of fact as to what distant events are simultaneous with the events in the space ship There is in their view no such matter of fact.
Lorentz (1895) The relativity of simultaneity, on the other hand supposes that in a given inertial frame clocks are synchronized according to the Einstein convention. 14 It then asserts that in any inertial frame moving with respect to the first frame, there are pairs of events that are simultaneous according to its clocks but not simultaneous according the clocks of the first frame (and vice versa, of course). As Adolf Grünbaum expressed it:
[I]f each Galilean observer adopts the particular metrical synchronization rule adopted by Einstein in Section 1 of his fundamental [1905] paper and if the spatial separation of P 1 and P 2 has a component along the line of the relative motion of the Galilean frames, then that relative motion issues in their choosing as metrically simultaneous different pairs of events from within the class of topologically simultaneous events at P 1 and P 2 … (1973: 353) Grünbaum is careful to emphasize in his discussion the difference between the conventionality and the relativity of simultaneity.
If one takes the special theory of relativity seriously, then one must take the relativity of simultaneity seriously since, as we saw above, it follows from the fundamental postulates of the theory. The status of the conventionality thesis is more controversial, and it has evoked a wide range of reactions. Indeed, the bulk of Jammer's (2006) monograph, Concepts of Simultaneity, is given over to discussion of the conventionality of simultaneity. In this chapter, I will be able only to sketch a few of the most important battle lines.
Hans Reichenbach (1958: §19) , along with his notable students Adolf Grünbaum (1973: chapter 12) and Wesley Salmon (1975: chapter 4) , vigorously defended the conventionality thesis. One job of the philosopher of science, as they saw it, is to separate factual from conventional elements in scientific theories, and they thought it was a triumph of modern physics cum philosophical analysis to have discovered that simultaneity-long thought to have some deep physical and even metaphysical reality--is (merely) conventional.
Since the conventionality thesis (at least in Reichenbach's classic presentation in §19 of his 1958 book) rests on the circularity argument given above (synchronizing clocks at distant points requires knowing the speed of the signal sent from one clock to the other, but finding the speed of anything, including a signal, requires synchronized clocks at distant points), it is tempting to think that the conventionality thesis can be To take a slightly different tack, then, suppose that we synchronized many clocks at A and then transported them to B ever more slowly. Could we not find a limit to the series of times indicated by the slow-transported clocks and use the limit to synchronize distant clocks (Bridgman 1962: 64-67, Ellis and Bowman 1967) ? It turns out that the limit exists and the synchronization agrees with standard synchrony. This proposal is considerably more complex and controversial than the first. The interested reader should look at the discussion of the Ellis and Bowman paper by Grünbaum, Salmon, van Fraassen, and Janis in the March, 1969 issue of Philosophy of Science, Friedman (1977 , and chapter 13 of Jammer (2006 There have also been numerous ingenious attempts to break out of the second half of the circle and argue that one can determine "one-way" light speeds (that is, the speed of a light signal from A to B, as opposed to a "round-trip" light speed in which the travel time of a light signal emitted and received at one location but reflected from a distant place is measured by one stationary clock) without the use of synchronized clocks.
Indeed, it is not at all obvious that the first determination of the speed of light by Ole R∅mer in 1676 is not a one-way determination. 16 Salmon (1977) is a comprehensive discussion of all such proposals then known. He concludes:
I have presented and discussed a number of methods which have been proposed for ascertaining the one-way speed of light, and I have given references to others. Some of these approaches represent methods which have actually been used to measure the speed of light.
Others are obviously "thought experiments." Some are quite new;
others have been around for quite a while. In all of these cases, I
believe, the arguments show that the methods under discussion do not provide convention-free means of ascertaining the one-way speed of light (although some of them are excellent ways of measuring the round-trip speed). I am inclined to conclude that the evidence, thus far, favors those who have claimed that the one-way speed of light unavoidably involves a non-trivial conventional element. (288) By an odd coincidence, Salmon's extended defense of the conventionality thesis was followed in the same journal issue by a short article by David Malament (1977) that is widely thought to be the definitive refutation of the view. Malament proves the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose S is a two-place relation on R 4 where i. S is (even just) implicitly definable from κ and O; ii.
S is an equivalence relation; iii.
S is non-trivial in the sense that there exist points p ∈ O and q ∉ O such that S(p,q); iv.
S is not the universal relation (which holds of all points), Malament's Proposition 2 shows that (1) is false and therefore by (2) that temporal relations, in particular standard simultaneity, are non-conventional.
Malament's result has clarified but not ended the discussion. One can always raise doubts about the reasonableness of the required conditions. Indeed, Norton (1992: 225) worries about the delicate dependence of the result of Proposition 2 on its conditions.
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He also reports (226) that Grünbaum has pointed out to him that condition (ii) might not be as innocent as it initially appears, and the extended discussion of the symmetry and transitivity of the simultaneity relation in Jammer (2006: chapter 11) gives this concern some weight. Grünbaum (forthcoming) reiterates this point but also questions Malament's first condition, a topic to which we will now turn.
The very brief explication of the conditions of Proposition 2 omitted any discussion of 'definition'. While this might seem over-fussy, Sarkar and Stachel (1999) raise serious concerns over the precise form of definition employed by Malament.
Roughly, a structure is defined if it is invariant under a class of transformations. Suppose an inertial observer emits a light pulse in all directions. In this light Malament's result, far from being a decisive refutation of conventionalism, looks to be nearly irrelevant to the thesis! Even granting the unique definability of the hypersurface orthogonal to O from κ and O itself, why would one suppose that the light sphere generated by a pulse of light from O at an earlier time intersects that hyperplane at a set of points equidistant from O? In the absence of some way to break Reichenbach's circle, only a stipulation that one-way lights speeds are the same in all directions will do. What is going on?
A partial answer may be found in a distinction drawn in Friedman (1977 426 One final consideration should be brought to bear on the conventionalism debate.
Of the seven basic units in the SI (Système Internationale) is equivalent to the fact) that reality consists of an infinity of layers of "now" which come into existence successively. But, if simultaneity is something relative in the sense just explained, reality cannot be split up into such layers in an objectively determined way. Each observer has his own set of "nows," and none of these various layers can claim the prerogative of representing the objective lapse of time. (Gödel 1949: 558) If the passage of time has something to do with the advance of the now or with (as Torretti preferred to put it) the advance of events (from past to future) through the now, then passage is undermined by the fact that there is no longer a unique now to serve as the now. There are (at least) as many nows as inertial frames, and there are a nondenumerable infinity of such frames. On this view, if there is no unique now, then there can be no objective lapsing of time or passage.
A second problem for passage raised by the relativity of simultaneity is that The upshot of this argument, the result of the revolution, is that the special theory of relativity is supposed to show that we live in a static or "block" 24 universe. Here is
Costa de Beauregard's depiction of it:
This is why first Minkowski, then Einstein, Weyl, Fantappiè, Feynman, and many others have imagined space-time and its material contents as spread out in four dimensions. For those authors, of whom I am one… relativity is a theory in which everything is "written" and where change is only relative to the perceptual mode of living beings.
( 1981: 430) These two arguments carry the weight and prestige of an important scientific theory and are endorsed, we learn, by physicists of the highest order. Yet it may be possible to find, within the confines of the special theory of relativity (or in the geometrical model of it called Minkowski spacetime) and within Einstein's stricture that there is no distant simultaneity, enough remnants of the pre-relativistic notion of becoming that one might hesitate to call the resulting picture of time in the special theory "static".
The first step in this direction is to note that in Minkowski spacetime the concept of time bifurcates. We have so far been discussing coordinate time, time spread from the origin an inertial system throughout the rest of space. One can also define what is called
proper time along the world line of a material particle. The path or world line of a material particle consists of points that are mutually or pair-wise timelike separated. Such a path is called a timelike world line or a timelike curve. We can write the invariant spacetime interval that we found in equation (1) in its infinitesimal form as
If we multiply (4) by -1, which of course still leaves it invariant, we can write
The quantity 'τ' is the proper time.
Timelike curves or world lines can be parameterized by proper time, τ. We can define proper time lengths between two points A and B on a timelike curve, τ AB as:
If we choose some point on the timelike line and assign it proper time 0, we can then define the proper time function along the timelike line by:
We can begin to see the importance of proper time in that, according to the clock hypothesis (Naber 1992: 52; Brown 2005: 94-95) , ideal clocks measure proper time.
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Suppose we then conjecture the following (Arthur 1982: 107) : "It is this proper time which is understood to measure the rate of becoming for the possible process following this timelike line (or worldline)." It is this idea of becoming along a timelike line, local becoming, that underlies my negative evaluation of the two anti-passage arguments presented above.
It is important to note one more fact about proper time. Since proper time is a function of all four variables x, y, z, t, if two ideal clocks are transported from event A to 25 The standard clocks of inertial observers indicate proper time; but in general clocks during their history may be accelerated. It is a non-trivial demand on a real clock that even when accelerated it read proper time (Sobel 1995 ≠ 0 (at least for some portions of the journey from A to B) and the change in proper time will be less than the change in co-ordinate time.
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Let us now return-slowly-to the two anti-passage arguments based on the special theory of relativity presented above by considering a classic article (Grünbaum 1971 ) that takes them-or at least the conclusion that "change is only relative to the perceptual mode of living beings" very seriously. The thesis of Grünbaum's article is this: "Becoming is mind-dependent because it is not an attribute of physical events per se but requires the occurrence of certain conceptualized conscious experiences of the occurrence of certain events. " (1971: 197) But what, according to Grünbaum, is this becoming that is mind-dependent?
In the common-sense view of the world, it is of the very essence of time that events occur now, or are past, or future. Furthermore, events are held to change with respect to belonging to the future or the present. Our commonplace use of tenses codifies our experience that any particular present is superseded by another whose event-content thereby 'comes into being'. It is this occurring now or coming into being of previously future events and their subsequent belonging to the past which is called 'becoming' or 'passage'. Thus, by involving reference to present occurrence, becoming involves more than mere occurrence at various serially ordered clock times. The past and future can be characterized as respectively before and after the present.
( 1971: 195) There are two elements in this passage that I wish to separate. The first is the common-sense idea indicated at the outset that events naturally sort themselves out into those that are present, past, and future. This aspect of time is typically called tense by philosophers. 27 Second is the distinction Grünbaum makes between becoming and the "mere occurrence [of events] at various serially ordered clock times". Grünbaum has no objection to (and, in fact, insists upon) the mind-independence of the latter.
[T]o assert in this context that becoming is mind-dependent is not to assert that the obtaining of the relation of temporal precedence is mind-dependent. Nor is it to assert that the mere occurrence of events at various serially ordered clock times is mind-dependent.
( 1971: 197) I suggested briefly in the introduction to this chapter that a philosopher might wish to consider the "mere occurrence [of events] at various serially ordered clock times" to be becoming, and I have defended the idea at greater length elsewhere (Savitt 2002) . I argue there that this usage captures the mainstream, metaphysically unobjectionable content of the concept of passage. Of course, this is essentially a terminological matter, but given the way I believe the term becoming has been used traditionally, if we do agree to use the term in that way, then Grünbaum and I agree that becoming is mind-independent.
We also agree that something else is mind-dependent, and that something else is tense. Grünbaum claims this directly. I claim it indirectly by claiming directly that the terms for tense, like 'now', 'past', and 'future', are indexical terms. Without minds there could not be language-users. 28 Without language-users there could not be languages.
Without languages there could not be indexical terms.
Whatever the differences between these two views, both agree to the extent that they entail the following key claim (Grunbaum 1971: 206) :
[W]hat qualifies a physical event at a time t as belonging to the present or as now is not some physical attribute of the event or some relation it sustains to other purely [29] physical events.
Once one disjoins passage from tense, one can see that the first argument against passage from the relativity of simultaneity, the one above presented by Gödel, is invalid.
From the fact that in different inertial frames different events are simultaneous (or, to put it more tendentiously, from the fact that in different inertial frames different events merely share the same t-coordinate), there is no conclusion to be drawn regarding passage, the successive occurrence of events. The failure of the first argument can be seen even more clearly if one recalls Einstein's stricture, the guiding insight of this chapter, that there is no distant simultaneity. The successive occurrence of events need not rely on distant simultaneity. It can be a local process, confined to a world line, possessing a proper time that is measured by a clock (Arthur 2008: section 2) .
Is this intelligible? Do we really have time if we have only this local process?
That is, do we really have time if there is no way to say of events not on a world line that they are past, present or future (relative to events on that world line)? That is, can there be passage without tense? This question, however, has an incorrect presupposition, as we shall see in our examination of the second anti-passage argument described above.
If the passage of time involves the future, "events which have not yet occurred" becoming the past, "events which have already occurred", how can there be passage if 29 'Purely' was doubtless added to avoid begging any questions with respect to the mind-body problem. To put this point in terms of a distinction introduced by Meehl and Sellars (1956, 252) , one can deny that some item or process is "purely" or narrowly physical (that is, physical 2 )-roughly, describable in physics--without being committed to its being broadly non-physical (or not physical 1 )-that is, outside the spacetime network.
there is no objective way of separating events into these two classes (as well as "events that are occurring now")? The second argument, Costa de Beauregard's argument, notes that there is no objective (that is, frame independent) way to make this division for spacelike separated events. In the absence of tense, it concludes there can be no passage. To put the same thought more formally, in the classical view of time as described by Torretti at the beginning of this chapter, there is a relation of earlier than (<) that completely orders events. The relation '<' is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive, and for any two events a and b, either a<b or b<a or a=b. In Minkowski spacetime there is still a relation of earlier than that is irreflexive, ant-symmetric and transitive, but the clause "either a<b or b<a or a=b" is no longer true. The ordering imposed by '<' is only partial rather than complete. Is complete ordering an essential feature of tense? Or should one rather say that in the shift to the special theory of relativity we learned that tense in fact was a partial rather than a complete ordering of events in spacetime? If one takes this latter course, then the second argument against passage in Minkowski spacetime, that the absence of tense implies the absence of passage, fails. The premise that there is no tense is incorrect.
There is a residual oddity in this view. (Putnam 1967: 246) If being present is tied to being simultaneous with (no matter how distant) and if there is no distant simultaneity, then in the history of some material object or person an event not on its world line can at some earlier times be in its future and at some later times be in its past without ever being present.
It is tempting to take a high-handed approach to this complaint. The empirical evidence for the special theory (as opposed to classical mechanics) is overwhelming. If the evidence supports a theory that forces us to an odd conclusion, common sense must bow to the evidence. It might be worth noting, however, that there are two ways in which one might attempt to mitigate the oddity of the conclusion.
First of all, one might simply identify the entire region of Minkowski spacetime that is spacelike separated from some event O, its "elsewhere," as its present. 30 One motivation for such a thought was provided by Minkowski himself, since he noted in his original paper (1908: 77-79) in effect that if the speed c (of electromagnetic radiation in vacuo) is allowed to increase without bound, then the region of spacelike separated points approaches as a limit the flat plane of events orthogonal to O's world line. If one then thinks of the elsewhere as a relativistic counterpart of the classical present in virtue of this reduction relation, it is then true that any event that is once future must be present before it is past.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that two events e and e' that are both spacelike separated from some event O and so both "present" in this sense to or for O may themselves be timelike separated and so invariantly time ordered. In fact, there is no upper bound on the proper time between e and e'. Identifying the elsewhere with the present does not seem to decrease oddity.
What, then, is the second way that might mitigate the oddity? To approach this idea, let us recognize that when we use indexical terms like 'now' and 'here' to indicate temporal or spatial location, the exact temporal or spatial extent or boundaries are context-dependent. When I say 'here', I might mean in this room, or in British Columbia, or even on Earth, since there is water here but not on Neptune. Similarly, with temporal terms I might wish to indicate a very short period of time ("Go to your room now.") or a much longer one ("Since we now have cell phones, public pay phones are disappearing."). All these heres are more-or-less spatially extended. All the nows are more-or-less temporally extended.
The now or present of experience is also extended. The extent may vary-estimates for normal human experience put the range from about .5 seconds to 3 seconds. That's the (varying) duration that we typically perceive as present or happening now-the period of time, say, that it takes to hear a sentence or a musical phrase. This period is called the specious or psychological present. To make the following discussion simpler (but without compromising any matters of principle, I hope), I will take the psychological present to be of one fixed convenient length, 1 second.
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The second proposal specifies a relativistic counterpart of the present by employing a period of (proper) time represented by a specious present. Suppose one chooses two events on a given timelike curve, say e 0 and e 1 , that are one second apart.
Then consider the region of spacetime that is the intersection of the future light cone of e 0 and the past light cone of e 1 . This is the set of events that, at least in principle, can be reached by a causal process from e 0 and are also able then to reach e 1 . In Savitt (2009) I call this structure the Alexandroff present for the interval e 0 to e 1 along the given timelike curve (assuming that it is parameterized by proper time) in honor of the Russian mathematician who first investigated these sets.
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31 This period of time is a completely objective matter, though the extent of its duration is set by subjective and pragmatic considerations.
32 Others prefer to call it the Stein present, in honour of Howard Stein, since those of us who have been toying with this structure lately were all more-or-less independently and more-or-less at the same time inspired to it by a remarkable set of reflections at the end of Stein (1991) . Still others call it a diamond present given its shape when one or two spatial dimensions are suppressed and when units are adjusted such that the numerical value of c is 1. It might in fact best be called the To return, finally, to the claim that it is odd that a future event can become past without ever being present, one can note that an Alexandroff present is about 300,000 km wide at its waist, given the convention adopted above that the interval between beginning and end is one second. This means that at least events in one's vicinity cannot become past without being present, if Alexandroff presents are deemed to be reasonable relativistic stand-ins or counterparts of the classical present. The oddity can happen with events on Saturn but not events in Sydney. Perhaps that helps.
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IV
In section III of this chapter I tried to show that a certain common view concerning time and the special theory of relativity is not true. The view is that the special theory mandates a "block" or static universe. I interpret this view to mean that there is no becoming, no passing or lapsing time, in Minkowski spacetime.
Since 'time' is an ambiguous term, 34 I tried to disambiguate it in this context into two strands, passage and tense. When these two strands are clearly separated, the two causal present, since it is the set of all events that can causally interact with any pair of events on the given world line between e 0 and e 1 . 33 The arguments in this section were influenced by the writings of and by conversations with Richard Arthur, Dennis Dieks, and Abner Shimony. The relevant papers will be found listed amongst the references. One can find a related view in Maudlin (2002) , and Dorato (2006: 107) writes that he defends in his way the same view as Maudlin. I have been helped throughout by the advice of Robert Rynasiewicz, who has saved me from numerous errors and who no doubt wishes that he had saved me from even more. I wish also to thank the editor and Christian Wuthrich for helpful suggestions.
main arguments for the "Special Relativity implies block universe" view fail. Moreover, we saw that there are two concepts of time in the special theory itself, co-ordinate time and proper time, the latter being a kind of time perfectly apt for becoming. What is surprising about the special theory (at least in this regard; there are other surprises of course) is that time qua passage is a local phenomenon, tied to a world line. For eons we have tied passage to an advancing global now, and this idea is buried deep in our worldview. It is an idea that we must transcend.
